A Cold War hardliner explains why this time is very different.
Michael Hirsh: The shoot-down of a Russian jet by Turkey represents the first time ever that a NATO ally has downed a Russian plane. Coming amid other tensions between Russia and the West, how worried are you by this?
Zbigniew Brzezinski: These tensions are serious but not fatal. In some ways, if good sense and intelligence prevail, they could even prove to be salutary, not only for dealing with a nasty regional problem but addressing the potentially more generally destructive consequences of a global system dominated by three superpowers.
MH: Why do you think this is possible?
ZB: I think that the West has reacted to the recent news from the Middle East in a calm fashion but at the same time not yielding to initial threats right after the shoot-down of the Russian plane. Moreover the Russians themselves, having taken a deep breath, also realize that to pump up the crisis is a road to nowhere. The only result could be a serious collision in which Russia would find itself in isolation. In effect, we might be on the brink of some progress among the major powers regarding not just the Turkish-Russian skirmish, but towards some salutary accommodation regarding containment of wider regional violence.
MH: Can you expand on what you mean by ‘salutary’?
ZB: I don’t think anyone thinks that escalating this dispute is worth a major conflict with truly destructive consequences. In early October, in a piece I wrote for the Financial Times, I urged an effort to engage Russia in serious negotiations about the future of the region. I think perhaps we may now be doing what needs to be done [in talks in Vienna], given the common threat inherent in the delicacy of the relations between the nuclear powers.
MH: You think there can be accommodation over Syria, even with the Russians shoring Assad up and the Americans calling for his ouster?
ZB: On Syria, there is no great national benefit for Russia in Assad remaining indefinitely in office, and there is no great national benefit for the U.S. in forcing him to quit instantly, and there is also a shared interest in avoiding a major U.S.-Russia collision. I may be naïve but I think this is one of those situations in which the stakes are not that dramatic. For a few weeks the opposite seemed potentially true in the case of Ukraine. This is why I then advocated in effect the accommodation by both us and the Russians to the idea that the Ukrainian problem should be ‘Finlandized’ insofar as the security is concerned [meaning Ukraine should not join NATO, even while remaining independent]. Now things seem to be pointing tentatively in that direction.
MH: You sound much more positive than you did in that October article, when you urged “strategic boldness,” saying American credibility in the Middle East and the region itself was at stake because the Russians were striking non-ISIS targets in Syria to help Bashar al-Assad. Are you more optimistic now?
ZB: At the time the initial reports indicated that Russians were going after local forces dependent on U.S. support. We had to warn them, and I think we did. it seems to me the reaction this time was measured. Putin blew out some steam but subsequently began to talk about coping with the problem. The Turks proved to be resilient and tough but without exaggerating the collision. … So in effect the parties to this unfolding drama have become more reasonable. But I think it was quite lucky the shoot-down in Turkey was not done by us. Because Putin’s ability to digest it would be much smaller. And I am glad it was not some sort of incident in the Baltic republics, where the Russian propensity to react would be greater, the Baltic capacity to respond would be minimal, and the necessity of a forceful response by the U.S. would be self-evident.
MH: Should we be worried about Russia cooperating with China—the other great power—in opposition to the United States?
ZB: I would think not. In the short term the geostrategic interests of China favor stability over conflict. Stability permits China to steadily increase its influence in pursuing its “One Belt, One Road” program, which is a twin program to increase Chinese access to the Indian Ocean and by sea and railroad into Central Asia, and through these countries into the West, and thereby gradually and carefully shift the balance of power in Central Asia between Russia and China in favor of China. The Russians can do nothing about it. And the countries involved welcome it, with the exception at this time of Kyrgyzstan. They know their independence would disappear if they became an integral part of the Moscow-promoted Eurasian Union.…
The Chinese are very good at being neutral publicly, but privately helping one side or another. And recently they voted in favor of Ukraine becoming a member of the U.N. Security Council. That’s hardly something the Russians favored.
MH: You were known as a hawk in the Cold War. You seem to think that U.S. and Russian interests are far more aligned now.
ZB: That’s right. If the situation in the Middle East gets completely out of hand, first the recently completed long-term agreement with Iran would unravel dangerously. That could in turn create very serious problems for Israel, and there are at least some people in the Israeli leadership tempted by the military option. That could become regionally explosive. It could also induce stronger reactions from outside the region. Russia and the West share an interest in stability. As far as Assad’s “transition” is concerned there is still a lot of negotiating to be done. But I don’t think that either party thinks its vital interests are dependent on him …
MH: But some Russia experts believe Putin’s goal is to resurrect Russia’s great power status, and he’ll stop at nothing to achieve that.
ZB: It may be his approach to these issues is irrational. He obviously at first was very angry at the news. But I think he very quickly realized there would be no payoff to him for escalating unless he is very eager for a war. But in that case, with whom and with what consequences for him?
