Syria wants to seize the current opportunity to place the Iskenderun issue on the agenda of any future talk, as part of its conditions for normalisation with Turkey.
By Fadel Manasfa, The Arab Weekly,
During a phone call with US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Ankara will not set a timetable for its operations in Syria and that its war against terrorism will continue unhindered.
The phone call came a week after Turkish forces targeted the strongholds of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, in response to the deadly bombing on Istiklal Street in Istanbul last November. It came also after Recep Tayyip Erdogan failed to entice Bashar al-Assad towards reconciliation as Assad did not see in it any benefit for him at present.
The Syrian president rejected the outstretched hand of Erdogan. Ankara’s declared purpose was to overcome past differences and set the stage for new relations, just as it did with its foes of yesterday, and I mean here Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE as part of what has been dubbed “zero- problems diplomacy.”
With this rejection, Ankara missed an opportunity to receive a Syrian authorisation that would have amounted to a green light to launch its military operation in northern Syria, without being accused of violating the sovereignty of another country. Turkey in fact wants to hit two birds with one stone: maintain strong relations with Russia, which has a military presence in Syria, and reconcile with a regime that it sees has clearly gained the upper hand over the 2011 uprising.
The official Syrian news agency, SANA, chose this particular juncture to publish a story about the 83rd anniversary of Turkey’s occupation of the so-called Iskenderun District, a geographic area under Turkish rule today. Syrian media had avoided talking about the issue when Syrian-Turkish relations were at their best.
The SANA story, which comes in the midst of Ankara’s attempts to end its dispute with Damascus, clearly shows that Syria wants to seize the current opportunity to place the Iskenderun issue on the agenda of any future talks as part of its conditions for normalisation with Turkey.
Although he failed in his leadership of the country and was unable to do away with the corruption plaguing his officials, hence fuelling the fires of the people’s uprising against his rule, Assad is a man who wisely reads developments and pragmatically changes positions when necessary.
Perhaps his decision not to move forward towards returning to the Arab League stemmed from his conviction that this return would not have brought any gains to Syria and above all would not have earned it international or regional legitimacy. Rather, it would have pushed it to accept Gulf dictates that would have jeopardised its close relations with Iran, which is an unacceptable option for the regime. It is so for many reasons, including Syria’s consideration for Iran’s position regarding the 2011 events and its military support, which helped save the Damascus regime when many of its friends denied it a helping hand.
With Turkey, Assad also toes a pragmatic line. He is very much aware that Turkey needs to pursue a policy of rapprochement with Damascus to rid itself of the Kurds in northern Syria and ensure control by Turkish Army forces over the two countries’ common border. This would render Erdogan a service that Assad does not want to provide for free. The Syrian president knows for a fact that there are interests at stake for Turkey in seeking rapprochement with Damascus. It wants stabilise its borders and tighten the screws on the Kurds, in addition to being relieved of the Syrian refugees’ burden. But accepting the return of these refugees to their home country will come with a steep price for Assad, as his regime is floundering under the pressure of economic and energy problems.
Erdogan could have used some economic inducements to show Syria goodwill and the advantages it could reap from reconciliation. He could have announced Ankara’s readiness to sponsor a Syria reconstruction conference or closed the media outlets based in Turkey and that are unsettling to Assad and his regime. He could even have postponed the military operation he seeks to carry out in northern Syria, until his rapprochement with Damascus became a reality.
Turkish diplomacy was somewhat hasty when it reached out directly to the Russians about the situation in Syria, thinking that the solution would come from Moscow and not from Damascus, and that Assad would agree to meet with Erdogan without hesitation assuming that Syria needs Turkey more than the opposite.
The opportunity is still there despite Assad’s refusal to reconcile with Erdogan’s Turkey. But the Turkish military operation in northern Syria should be set against the background of a precise and quick mission and not just be a cover for violating the sovereignty of Syrian. The regime in Ankara must also clearly define its position towards the Syrian opposition groups some of which are active in Turkey. Furthermore, the border issues must be settled in a way that does not associate Assad with a normalisation process that alters the geography of Syria for the sake of Turkey’s national security. Otherwise, the rapprochement of the two regimes will stay in limbo for a long while.
Fadel Manasfa is a Palestinian writer.
